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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1940 and the early 1970s, producers used asbestos2 in over
3000 products commonly found in residential, commercial, and public
buildings.3 Such products included: "floor tile, textile fireproofing,
insulation, ceiling tile, building panels, plaster and stucco." 4 Despite the
fact that the dangers of exposure to asbestos date back 2000 years, 5 public
concern was not aroused until the 1973 case of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp.6 This same year, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency started curtailing the use of asbestos. 7 The curtailment
trend has culminated in the current laws and regulations requiring asbestos
abatement.8 This Comment will focus on assumption of the risk and
asbestos removers, those workers whose employment resulted from the
enactment of laws and regulations that require asbestos abatement 9
generally, and in the most extreme situations, asbestos removal. 10
1 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991).
2 "Asbestos" is defined as "a group of naturally occurring minerals that separate into
fibers of high tensile strength, are resistant to heat, wear, and chemicals, including, but not
limited to, chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, actinolite, tremolite, anthophylite and their
manufactured asbestiform materials." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3710.01(A) (Anderson
1988).
3 Barbara Christensen and Kristine Larscheid, Asbestos Abatement- The Second Wave
of the Asbestos Litigation Industry, 27 WASHBURN L.J 454, 456 (1988).
4 1d.
5 Id. at 454.
6 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). This case
marked the first successful action brought by an insulation worker against an asbestos
insulation manufacturer. See Christensen and Larscheid, supra note 3, at 457 n.26. The
Fifth Circuit broke with all prior precedent by refusing to accept the manufacturer's state of
the art defense. Id.
7 Christensen and Larscheid, supra note 3, at 458; Melissa Zelen, Products Liability
Issues in School Asbestos Litigation, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 467, 471 (1984-85).
8 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-22 (1988); see also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3710.01
(Anderson 1988). For a more detailed discussion of the trend leading up to the current laws
and regulations governing asbestos abatement, see Zelen, supra note 7, at 471-72.
9 The major types of abatement are encapsulation, enclosure, and removal.
Christensen and Larscheid, supra note 3, at 458.
10 Removal is the only permanent method of abatement, but also the most expensive.
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Part II of this paper will set the legal stage for the Cremeans decision
by exploring strict products liability law and defenses in Ohio. Part III will
provide the historical roots of the assumption of the risk defense. Part IV
will focus on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Cremeans v. Willmar
Henderson Mfg. Co. and its progeny, which arguably eliminated the
availability of the defense of assumption of the risk in the employment
setting. Part V will explore the various elements of the assumption of the
risk defense. Part VI will apply these elements and the Cremeans decision
to the asbestos remover and conclude that an asbestos remover cannot
assume the risk of contracting asbestosis or a related disease in the normal
performance of his or her employment.
II. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND DEFENSES IN OIno
Nationally, strict products liability law evolved out of contract and
negligence law. Ohio first recognized a strict products liability action in the
seminal case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. 11
From Rogers, the Supreme Court of Ohio further extended the doctrine
of strict products liability, 12 culminating in the court's formal adoption in
1977 of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law of
Ohio.13
11 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958).
12 See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966).
13 Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ohio 1977). The Restatement
provides:
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
2. The rule stated in subsection one applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965). The section imposes liability even where
the manufacturer has exercised "all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."
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Four years later, in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,14 the court
applied section 402A strict liability to products defectively designed, in
addition to those suffering from a manufacturing defect. 15 According to the
court, a product is "defectively designed" if it fails the "consumer
expectation test," namely, the product is more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner. 
16
The court subsequently extended the concept of a "defectively
designed" product by creating a second test for defective design in Knitz v.
Minster Machine Co. 17 Specifically, the court held that "a product design
is in a defective condition if it is more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect. . . or if the benefits of the challenged design do
not outweigh the risk inherent in such design." 18 Thus, if a product fails
either the "consumer expectation test" or the "risk/benefit test," it is
considered "defectively designed" and the manufacturer will be held
strictly liable.
More recently, the Ohio Supreme Court in Crislip v. TCH Liquidating
Co., 19 imposed strict products liability on a manufacturer of an
"unreasonably dangerous" or "unavoidably unsafe" product when the
manufacturer fails to warn or inadequately warns of the dangerous
condition of the product.20
In 1988, the Ohio General Assembly codified much of the existing
common law by enacting Ohio's Tort Reform Act, which added sections
2307.71 through 2307.80 and 2315.20 to the Ohio Revised Code. A
scholar in the field provided commentary on Ohio's Tort Reform and stated
that,
a substantial body of law had developed, largely consistent from court to
court and from year to year. It was in this context that [tort reform]...
was enacted, thereby for the first time codifying all causes of action and
defenses in most product liability cases which arise on or after January 5,
1988.21
14 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981).
15 ld. at 577.
16 1d.
17 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
18 Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
19 556 N.E.2d 1177 (Ohio 1990).
20 Id. at 1183.
21 JAMES LOWE, PRODUCT LiABILrrY IN OHIO AFTER TORT REFoRM 25 (1988)
(emphasis added).
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In essence, the Ohio legislature codified the existing common law.
For example, in Ohio Revised Code section 2307.75, which governs
the risk/benefit and consumer expectation tests, the legislature enacted the
rule of Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., providing that:
[A] product is defective in design or formulation if either of the following
applies:
(1) When it left the control of its manufacturer, the
foreseeable risks associated with its design or
formulation... exceeded the benefits associated with that design
or formulation... ;
(2) It is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner.
22
Additionally, section 2307.76 of the Ohio Revised Code addresses
defective products due to inadequate warnings or instructions, codifying
Crislip.23
22 0moREV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)(1), (2) (Anderson 1988).
23 Section 2307.76 reads as follows:
(A) Subject to divisions (B) and (C) of this section, a product is defective due to
inadequate warning or instruction if either of the following applies:
(1) It is defective due to inadequate warning or instruction at the time of
marketing if, when it left the control of its manufacturer, both of the
following applied:
(a) The manufacturer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known about a risk that is associated with the product
and that allegedly caused the harm for which the plaintiff seeks to
recover compensatory damages;
(b) The manufacturer failed to provide the warning or instruction
that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would have
provided concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood that the
product would cause harm of the type for which the claimant seeks
to recover compensatory damages and in light of the likely
seriousness of that harm.
(2) It is defective due to inadequate post-marketing warning or instruction if,
at a relevant time after it left the control of its manufacturer, both of the
following applied:
(a) The manufacturer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known about a risk that is associated with the product
and that allegedly caused harm for which the claimant seeks to
recover compensatory damages;
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When confronted with a claim of strict products liability, a
manufacturer may assert two general defenses. First, a manufacturer may
argue that the plaintiff "misused the product in an unforeseeable
manner." 24 Second, a manufacturer may prove that the plaintiff
"voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risk occasioned by the defect."25
Moreover, although a manufacturer may assert contributory or comparative
negligence, 26 the manufacturer should argue it in terms of the plaintiff's
implied assumption of the risk because the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled
that, "[the] principles of comparative negligence.., have no application to
a products liability case based upon strict liability in tort." 27
Section 2315.20 of the Ohio Revised Code addresses the defense of
assumption of the risk and provides that:
Express or implied assumption of the risk may be asserted as an
affirmative defense to a product liability claim ... and if it is determined
that the claimant expressly or impliedly assumed a risk and that such
express or implied assumption was a direct and proximate cause of harm
for which the claimant seeks to recover damages, the express or implied
assumption of the risk is a complete bar to the recovery of those
damages. 2 8
This Comment will focus exclusively on implied assumption of the risk.29
(b) The manufacturer failed to provide the post-marketing warning
or instruction that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would
have provided concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood that
the product would cause harm of the type for which the claimant
seeks to recover compensatory damages and in ight of the likely
seriousness of that harm.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76 (Anderson 1988) (emphasis added).
24 Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ohio 1984).
25 See Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ohio 1987); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
26 Ohio now recognizes comparative negligence. See O1-IO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.19 (Anderson 1988).
2 7 Bowling, 511 N.E.2d at 380.
2 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(B)(1), (2) (Anderson 1988) (codifying Onderko v.
Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1987)).
29 Express assumption of the risk occurs when "[a] plaintiff who by contract or
otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or
reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm.... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496B (1965). See, e.g., Baker Pac. Corp. v. Suttles, 269 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (Ct. App.
1990) (The employer required asbestos removers to sign a release before beginning ajob, in
which the remover "knowingly assume[d] all risks in connection with potential exposure to
asbestos," and "waive[d] and relinquish[ed] any and all claims of every nature.., which
14551992]
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Implied assumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff does not
"expressly consent to accept the risk; but by voluntarily electing to proceed
with knowledge of the risk in a manner which will expose him to it, he
manifests a willingness to accept [the risk] . . .[and] therefore [is] barred
from recovery . , "30 There are two types of implied assumption of the
risk-primary and secondary. 31
Implied primary assumption of the risk "occurs when either the
defendant is not negligent" or when the defendant did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff or did not breach an owed duty. 32 This Comment will not deal
with implied primary assumption of the risk, rather, it will examine
implied secondary assumption of the risk.
Implied secondary assumption of the risk "occurs when the plaintiff
voluntarily encounters a known risk of harm created by the defendant's
negligence." 33  In the case of defective products, the defendant
manufacturer is "negligent" because it has breached its duty of providing
the consumer with a product that lives up to the "consumer's expectations"
and in which its "risks outweigh its benefits." Consequently, "[s]ince the
negligence of the defendant has been established, [implied] secondary
assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense." 34
Implied secondary assumption of the risk is broken down further into
reasonable and unreasonable assumption of the risk.35 The focus of this
paper will be on the latter, unreasonable assumption of the risk.36
Unreasonable implied secondary assumption of the risk "occurs when the
plaintiff voluntarily but unreasonably decides to proceed in the face of a
known risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct." 37 In Cremeans,
are in any way, directly or indirectly, related to exposure to asbestos and asbestos-
containing materials." Although this release was ruled invalid by the court, it provides an
excellent example of an employer's attempt to obtain a statement of its employees' express
assumption of the risk.).
3 0 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFTORTS § 496C cmt. b (1965).
31 Matthew J. Toddy, Case Comment, Asswnption of the Risk Merged with
Contributory Negligence: Anderson v. Ceccardi, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1062 (1984) (citing
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959)).
3 2 Id. at 1062.
33 Id. at 1063.
34 ld.
35 Id. (citing Fleming James, Asswnpion of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185, 188-89 (1968)).
36 "Reasonable" assumption of the risk has been the subject of much debate because it
turns on whether the court should deny recovery to a plaintiff who has acted reasonably (the
law generally encourages reasonable behavior) "solely because the plaintiff voluntarily
incurred a known risk." Toddy, supra note 31, at 1064.
37 Id. (citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 95 (N.J.
1959)).
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the Supreme Court of Ohio was specifically referring to unreasonable
implied secondary assumption of the risk when it held that "[a]n employee
does not voluntarily or unreasonably assume the risk of injury which
occurs in the course of his or her employment when that risk must be
encountered in the normal performance of his or her required job duties
and responsibilities." 38
III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
DEFENSE
One of the reasons the Cremeans court ruled that assumption of the
risk is not a valid defense for a manufacturer when the injured user is an
employee who encounters the defective product "in the normal
performance of his or her required job duties and responsibilities" 39 can be
traced to the historical roots of the defense. The court opined that the
historical purpose of the doctrine of assumption of the risk, which was to
keep "human overhead" down to fuel industrial growth, has been
undercut. 40 Specifically, the court stated that
[t]he defense of assumption of the risk is a product of laissez-faire
economics... [and] was judicially developed... to insulate the
employer as much as possible from bearing the human overhead which is
an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized
business. The general purpose behind this development in the common law
seems to have been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry. 4 1
The rationale of "keeping down human overhead" is most evident in the
United States Supreme Court case of Tuttle v. Milwaukee Ry.,42 decided in
1887. In Tuttle, the Court ruled that a railroad worker assumed the risk of
his injury because
the servant, when he engages in [a particular] employment, does so in
view of all the incidental hazards, and that he and the employer, when
making their negotiations, fixing the terms and agreeing upon the
compensation that shall be paid to him, must have contemplated these as
having an important bearing upon their stipulations. 43
38 Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991)
(emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1205-06.
41 Id. (quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943)).
42 122 U.S. 189 (1887).
43 Id. at 195.
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This philosophy resulted in the typical scenario of a worker being
injured on the job by a defective product, the manufacturer asserting that
the worker had "assumed the risk" of injury, and the courts agreeing with
the manufacturer. Consequently, the worker was forced to absorb the cost
of his or her injury alone. This kept the cost of the product low and
allowed industry to flourish at the expense of the injured worker.
With regard to occupational diseases, commentators simply applied the
Tuttle Court's rationale and explained the theory as follows: "[I]n a fully
competitive employment market, market transactions between employers
and employees could lead to efficient levels of health hazards and equitable
compensation for diseased workers. Workers will not accept jobs posing
known risks, unless the position offers some additional, attractive
offsetting feature." 44
In reality, however, this philosophy provided a catalyst for industrial
growth at the expense of workers' lives and health while also creating an
incentive for employers (and manufacturers) to conceal or not seek out
knowledge of dangers. In terms of asbestos-related diseases specifically,
"the problems of the latency factor and tracing environmental causes of the
disease" 45 led "workers [to] fail to demand an adequate wage premium for
the risk, and employers [to] provide too little control of health risks." 46
Therefore, legislatures passed workers' compensation laws and courts
began to impose strict products liability, which allowed the injured worker
to recover above and beyond the allotments provided by workers'
compensation. 47
IV. CREMEANS v. WILLMAR HENDERSON MFG. Co. 48 AND rrS PROGENY
The defendant manufacturer, Willmar Henderson Manufacturing Co.,
sold a loader without its protective cage to the defendant employer, Sohio
Chemical Co.49 Sohio employed the plaintiff, Michael Cremeans, to
operate the Willmar loader in fertilizer bins to scoop out fertilizer for
hauling elsewhere. 50  Cremeans knew that "fertilizer avalanches"
44 W. Kip Viseusi, Compensating Workplace Toxic Torts, 37 AcAD. POL. Sci. 126,
127 (1988).
45 Id. at 128.
46 Id.
47 See Paul Weiler, Workers' Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a
Tort and Non-Tort Regime, 50 OIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989).
48 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991).
49 Id. at 1204.
50 Id.
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occasionally occurred and expressed concerned that a loader without a cage
would leave the operator unprotected. 51 Nonetheless, he continued to
operate the loader because "it was his job." 52 On one occasion, while
Cremeans' loader was inside a bin scooping out fertilizer, the fertilizer
poured out onto the front end of the loader, which resulted in injury to
Cremeans. 53 If the loader had been equipped with a protective cage,
Cremeans would not have been injured. 54
The court held that "[a]n employee does not voluntarily or
unreasonably assume the risk of injury which occurs in the course of his or
her employment when that risk must be encountered in the normal
performance of his or her job duties and responsibilities." 55
As explained in Part III above, the court opined that the historic
purpose underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk, which was to
keep down "human overhead" to fuel industrial growth, has been
undercut. 56
The court further reasoned that "an employee must either accept the
dangers of his or her job or face the prospect of finding new employment
in an economic setting where the supply of work has become increasingly
limited." 57 Moreover, the court recognized that an Ohio appellate court, in
Prentiss v. Kirtz, decided to bar assumption of the risk as a valid defense
in the context of claims for injury on the job as far back as 1977. 58
In addition, many other courts, including state high courts, have
persuasively disallowed assumption of the risk under similar
circumstances. 59 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio abolished the
51 Id. at 1205.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1207.
56 Id. at 1205-06.
57 Id. at 1207.
58 Prentiss v. Kirtz, 374 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). The defense assumption of
the risk has also been abandoned in negligence actions. See Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451
N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1983); Hirschback v. Cincinnati Gas & Elect. Co., 452 N.E.2d 326
(Ohio 1983).
59 Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 1983); Rhoads v.
Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Kitchens v. Winter Co.
Bldrs., 289 S.E.2d 807, 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326
N.E.2d 74, 87 (1. App. Ct. 1975)); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d
140, 148 (N.J. 1979); Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1207
(Ohio 1991) (citing Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d 132, 140-41 (Or. 1976));
Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1969).
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assumption of the risk defense in the employment setting. 60 It did so as a
policy decision to further modern economic and social philosophies
concerning employer/employee relationships, to be consistent with relevant
Ohio case law, and to join the prevailing view expressed by other state
high courts.
Since the Cremeans decision, Ohio courts have applied the holding
almost uniformly. In Kukay v. Crown Controls Corp.,61 the Sixth Appellate
District ruled that the plaintiff-worker could not assume the risk of injuries
resulting from a defective forklift he was operating in the course of his job
duties and responsibilities. 62
The Third Appellate District has been the most active in interpreting
the Cremeans decision. In Ball v. M.R. Phlipot Masonry Co., 63 the first
decision following Cremeans, the court ruled assumption of the risk
unavailable as a defense when unattended and unsecured bricks fell on the
plaintiff-pipefitter. In Sigman v. General Electric Co.,64 the court dealt
with defective products that resulted in the death of an electric-line repair
person. The court adopted and extended Cremeans in holding "assumption
of the risk by an injured employee to be no defense for the manufacturer in
a products liability case brought by the employee for recovery for injuries
claimed to have been proximately caused by a defective product used in the
performance of the employee's required job duties, even in the case of
inherently dangerous job duties."65
The only Ohio court to limit Cremeans was the Court of Appeals for
Tuscarawas County in Syler v. Signode Corp.66 In Syler, the plaintiff was a
maintenance worker whose job duties included performing routine
maintenance on a brick-packaging machine. 67 On the occasion at issue, the
plaintiff-worker sustained injuries while attempting to repair the machine.
Specifically, the plaintiff-worker entered the interior of the machine and
yelled to one of his co-workers to turn off the machine's power so that the
bricks could be safely realigned. 68 While the plaintiff-worker was
attempting to realign the bricks, the machine began moving and "pinched
60 The Creneans court noted, however, that "an employee may voluntarily and
unreasonably encounter a known risk when the employee intentionally causes his or her
own injury." Creneans, 566 N.E.2d at 1207 n.2 (emphasis added).
61 No. S-90-7, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5178 (6th Dist. Oct. 25, 1991).
62 Id. at 5178, *13.
63 No. 17-90-4, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1625 (3d Dist. Apr. 10, 1991).
64 602 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
65 Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
66 601 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
6 7 Id. at 226.
6 8 Id. at 227.
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[his] head against a stationary beam, causing personal injuries."69 The
court held that, "[a] summary judgment finding [of] assumption of the risk
is inappropriate upon these disputed facts [as] supported by both the
syllabus in Cremeans and the rationale of a majority of its justices."7° The
court reasoned that Justice Wright's opinion in Cremeans served as the
pivotal or swing opinion, and as such, ruled in accordance with that
opinion in stating that "questions of assumption of the risk should
generally be left to the jury." 71 Thus, the court limited the Cremeans
holding by finding that a jury could determine that a worker assumed the
risk of injuries incurred as a result of a defective product encountered in
the normal performance of his or her job duties.
Syler notwithstanding, Ohio courts seem willing to continue the trend
of abolishing the defense of assumption of the risk in all employment
settings.
V. THE ELEMENTS OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
The defense of assumption of the risk "consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known risk posed by a defective
product." 72 In this section, the elements "voluntarily," "unreasonably,"
and "known" will be examined.
Section 496E(1) of the Restatement provides the general rule: "A
plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily accepts the
risk. " 73 This section defines "voluntary" in the negative in subsection two
by explaining that
[t]he plaintiffs acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct
in order to (a) avert harm to himself or another, or (b) exercise or protect
a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him. 74
In comment c to section 496E of the Restatement, the concept of
"voluntary" is further described in light of the defendant's conduct as
69 Id.
70 Id. at 229.
71 Id.
72 Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ohio 1987). Because
section 2315.20 of the Ohio Revised Code does not define assumption of the risk, the
Onderko definition will be used because the Tort Reform Act is generally viewed as
codifying the common law. See LOWE, supra note 21.
7 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTs § 496E (1965).
74 Id.
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follows: "[A] defendant who, by his own wrong, has compelled the
plaintiff to chose between two evils cannot be permitted to say that the
plaintiff is barred from recovery because he has made the choice." 75
Therefore, where the defendant-manufacturer has breached its duty to place
a product free from defects into the stream of commerce, it has
"compelled" the plaintiff-worker to choose between the "evils" of
confrontation of the defective product or loss of job.
The defendant-manufacturer may assert that the plaintiff-worker need
not seek and maintain employment in a position that exposes him or her to
defective products. This argument is without merit, however, because the
final sentence in comment c states, "[t]he existence of an alternative course
of conduct which would avert the harm, or protect the right or privilege,
does not make the plaintiff's choice voluntary, if the alternative is one
which he can not reasonably be required to accept." 76
In Hull v. Merck & Co.,77 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit defined the element of "voluntariness" as a plaintiff acting
"without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances
or by coercion .... "78 The key to this definition turns on the use of the
words "by coercion." As one commentator explained, "in an environment
virtually requiring wage-based employment, voluntary assumption of risk
is necessarily severely constrained by economic coercion."79 This is
precisely the type of coercion the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with in
the Cremeans decision, and which led the court to abolish the defense of
assumption of the risk in the employment setting. Specifically, the court
stated that "the economic pressures associated with the reality of today's
workplace inevitably came to bear on Cremeans' decision to encounter the
risk." 80 Other courts have shown the same sensitivity to the worker's lack
of choice regarding confrontation of a defective product or loss of
employment. 81
An examination of the second element, that the confrontation of the
risk must be "unreasonable," will be deferred until after the "knowledge"
element is explored. This is because the question of unreasonable
75 Id.
76 Id. (emphasis added). The concept of "reasonableness" will be examined below.
77 758 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1985).
78 Id. at 1476.
7 9 Jane P. North, Enployees' Assumption of Risk" Real or lllusory C7oice?, 52 TENN.
L. REv. 35, 62 (1984) (emphasis added).
8 0 Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ohio 1991).
81 See, e.g., Norris v. ACF Indus., 609 F. Supp. 549 (D. W.Va. 1985); Baker Pan.
Corp. v. Suttles, 269 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Ct. App. 1990); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ONTHE LAWOFTORTS § 68, at 492 & n.22 (5th ed. 1984).
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assumption of the risk is intimately bound up with the question of whether
the plaintiff-worker had knowledge of the defect in the product.
Section 496D of the Restatement sets forth the general rule: "[A]
plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's
conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates
its unreasonable character." 82 Comments b and c to this section expound
upon the rule in stating that the plaintiff "must not only be aware of the
facts which create the danger, but must also appreciate the danger itself and
the nature, character, and extent which make it unreasonable," 83 and this
must be determined in light of "what the particular plaintiff in fact sees,
knows, understands and appreciates."84 Thus, a subjective standard should
be applied.85
An additional component to the "knowledge" element turns on whether
"particularized knowledge of the specific defect" is required. 86 Most
commentators suggest that the law requires the plaintiff to have "had actual
knowledge of the particular risk, or the specific danger, which resulted in
injury, [while] [k]nowledge of general risks, those merely within the range
of possibility, is not sufficient." 87
With respect to defective products causing 88 long-term progressive
diseases such as asbestosis and related diseases, the requirements of the
knowledge element become ambiguous. The plaintiff-worker is faced with
an invisible agent rather than a mechanical one, and the chances of
contracting the disease are not certain. 89 Thus, the plaintiff-worker cannot
actually see the defective product, nor does the plaintiff-worker know if he
or she will be part of the percentage of workers that will in fact contract
the disease; 90 hence, the subjective standard may not be met.
The aforementioned elements of "voluntariness" and "knowledge" both
figure into the determination of "unreasonableness." This particular
element focuses on the plaintiff-worker's "negligen[ce] in choosing to
8 2 RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
83 Id. at cmt. b.
84 Id. at cmt. c.
85 See Skonberg v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991).
86 KEETON r" AL., supra note 81, § 68 n.68; see also Hovanec v. Hamischfeger
Corp., 807 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1987).
87 Paul Rosenlund & Paul Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of
Asswnption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 225, 250-51
(1986). But see Hull v. Merck & Co., 758 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985).
88 The causation issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
89 North, supra note 79, at n.159.
90 Id.
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encounter the risk," 91 and therefore, necessarily turns on the plaintiff-
worker's fault. The plaintiff-worker can only be at fault if he or she knew
of the particular risk and voluntarily encountered it. Thus, even if the
plaintiff-worker knows that exposure to a toxic substance can cause death,
he or she will be "at fault" only if encountering the risk was "voluntary,"
that is, not "economically coerced." For example, in the case of workers
exposed to defective products that cause occupational diseases, "[i]t may
not be at all unreasonable for workers to assume that they will not be in
that percentage of the workforce that will be affected by long-term
exposure to a toxic substance," 92 especially in the context of economic
pressures to obtain and maintain employment.
This particular element, which focuses on the plaintiff's fault, presents
a contradiction in light of the theory behind strict products liability. Strict
products liability was judicially developed to disregard the issue of fault
and look instead to the defectiveness of the product, not the plaintiff's
conduct. On the other hand, the defense of assumption of the risk
encompasses the idea that the plaintiff voluntarily confronted a known risk.
Thus,
[s]ince the plaintiff [is] at fault, he is barred from recovery. For this
defense to make sense and be fair, the plaintiff should only be barred if his
fault, his assumption of the risk, is greater than the liability of the
manufacturer. . . [, however,] this would create a comparative fault
analysis[, which] the Ohio Supreme Court rejected... in Bowling.93
Consequently, the final part of this paper will examine the asbestos
remover and assumption of the risk in terms only of the plaintiff-remover's
voluntary confrontation of a known risk.
VI. THE ASBESTOS REMOVER, ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, AND
CREMEANS
Most of the cases referred to above dealt with fact patterns in which
the employee sustained an immediate injury from the use of a defective
product in carrying out his or her job duties. 94 With respect to asbestos
9 1 KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 68.
92 North, supra note 79, at n.159.
93 Gregory Lambert, Note, Tort Law: What Defenses are there to a Products Liability
Action in Ohio?, 15 U. DAYTONL. REv. 173, 1.85 (1989).
94 See Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987) (employee was killed by
defective dump truck); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982) (employee lost two fingers while operating defective punch press);
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removers, however, the "compensable harm is a long-term progressive
disease, marked by a long latency period and irreversible progression of
illness after the onset of the disease." 95 Nevertheless, both situations
involve a defective product, "encountered in the normal performance of the
employee's required job duties," that causes the employee injury. Thus,
the question arises, would Cremeans apply to a situation where an asbestos
remover contracts asbestosis or a related disease in the normal performance
of his or her employment?
Examining an asbestos remover's claim from its logical beginnings, it
must be determined whether asbestos is a defective product when
accompanied by an adequate warning. 96 In order to subject the
manufacturer of a defective product to strict products liability, the
consumer expectation or risk/benefit test must be applied. The Knitz case
and section 2307.76 of the Ohio Revised Code set forth these two tests and
explain that if the product fails either test, it is defective and the
manufacturer is subject to strict products liability. 97 Consequently, if an
"ordinary consumer," which arguably does not include an asbestos
remover, would not expect to develop a fatal disease as a result of
exposure to asbestos, then the asbestos manufacturer would be subject to
strict liability. Under the risk/benefit test, if the risks of the product
outweigh its benefits, then the product is deemed defective. Although at
first blush this seems to apply to asbestos removers, such applicability
depends upon the extent to which courts will be willing to allow strict
products liability actions to be brought by asbestos removers. Asbestos
removers are not consumers, users, or purchasers, the usual proponents of
a strict products liability cause of action.
An alternative argument to prove that asbestos is a defective product
for a "remover case" can be made as follows: because the federal and state
legislatures have deemed asbestos so hazardous as to mandate its removal
from public, commercial, and residential buildings, it is per se a defective
product, hence subjecting asbestos manufacturers to strict liability.98
After the plaintiff-remover establishes asbestos as a defective product
subject to strict products liability, the defendant-asbestos manufacturer will
Prentiss v. Kirtz, 374 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (employee lost fingers while
operating a grinding wheel).
95 North, supra note 79, at 61 n.159.
96 Workers who were exposed to asbestos from 1940 to the early 1970s have shown
asbestos to be a defective product subject to Restatement section 402A or Ohio Revised
Code section 2307.71 et seq. (strict liability employing a failure to warn theory).
97 Knitz 432 N.E.2d 814; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)(1), (2) (Anderson
1988).
98 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-55 (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 4011-22 (1988); QO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3710.01 (Anderson 1988).
14651992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
assert that the plaintiff-remover assumed the risk. The defendant-asbestos
manufacturer will argue that the plaintiff-remover knows that exposure to
asbestos can lead to early death.
The plaintiff-remover may rebut with the argument that even if he or
she possesses knowledge of the possibility of contracting asbestos-related
diseases upon exposure, researchers can predict only that a certain
percentage of workers in the industry will contract the disease. 99 The
United States Department of Labor estimates that of the roughly 700,000
workers who suffer from long-term total disability caused by occupational
diseases10o annually, 85,000 are victims of asbestos-related diseases
alone. o10 One expert predicts that two-fifths of workers exposed to asbestos
will die from such exposure. 10 2 Although these statistics deal with the
industrial worker who was exposed to asbestos between the years of 1940
to the early 1970s, they are still relevant because even though removers are
required by law to wear certain protective equipment, 10 3 OSHA
acknowledges that respirator "filter efficiency for asbestos has not been
thoroughly tested."10 4
Assuming however, that the plaintiff-remover is found to possess the
requisite knowledge of the particular risk of exposure to asbestos, namely,
early death, the next argument concerns the question of "voluntariness."
The plaintiff-remover will assert that his or her acceptance and
maintenance of employment was compelled by economic pressures.
As explained in Part V above, courts have rationalized that by mere
acceptance of employment and economic compulsion to remain employed,
the worker can no longer "voluntarily" assume the risk of a known
99 North, supra note 79, at n. 159.
100 The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that
[ain occupational disease is compensable under Ohio Revised Code section
4123.68(BB) where the following criteria exist: (1) the disease is contracted in the
course of employment; (2) the disease is peculiar to the claimant's employment by its
causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or conditions of employment result in
a hazard which distinguishes the employment generally; and (3) the employment creates
a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than in the
public generally.
State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 327 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ohio 1975).
101 Viscusi, supra note 44, at 126-27.
102 DANIEL BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
STRUGGLES IN THE UNrrED STATES 84 (1978).
103 See, e.g., OHmo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3710.08 (Anderson 1988).
104 49 Fed. Reg. 14,125 (1984) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. parts 1910 and 1926).
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danger. 05 The question remains, however, can the asbestos remover
successfully argue that he or she did not "voluntarily" assume the risk of a
known danger?
A leading commentator in the field believes that the asbestos-remover
can successfully argue that he or she did not "voluntarily" assume the
risk. 106 Specifically, Lloyd A. Fox suggests that "where the plaintiff would
have to give up a job in order to avoid exposure to asbestos ... [this
would] negate any attempt to use the assumption of the risk defense." 10 7
Section 523 of the Restatement, which deals with "assumption of the
risk of harm from an abnormally dangerous activity," adopts in comment f
the rule that the plaintiff "does not assume the risk when the defendant's
conduct has forced upon him the choice of two unreasonable
alternatives." 108 Section 496E comment c of the Restatement explains
further that "[a] defendant who, by his own wrong, has compelled the
plaintiff to choose between two evils cannot be permitted to say that the
plaintiff is barred from recovery because he has made the choice."10 9
Applying these Restatement sections to the asbestos remover's claim
that he or she did not "voluntarily" assume the risk, it follows that because
the defendant-manufacturer placed a defective product into the stream of
commerce, it cannot now force the plaintiff-remover to "choose between
two evils"-unemployment or possible contraction of an asbestos-related
disease-and then claim that the plaintiff-remover should be barred from
recovery.
In addition, the argument that the asbestos remover is compensated for
the risks associated with such employment is not convincing because
asbestos removers will probably fail to demand a higher wage. Further, the
asbestos remover will also probably fail to demand more employer
safeguards against the health risks associated with asbestos because of the
long latency period and difficulty in tracing the causative agent. Lastly,
asbestos removers may believe that the protective equipment they are
mandated to wear actually does protect them from exposure to the toxic
agent, which OSHA acknowledges may not be true.
In Cremeans, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the economic
compulsion rationale and held that unless an employee intentionally causes
his or her own injury, the "employee does not voluntarily or unreasonably
105 Id. See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991) (female worker chose to undergo sterilization in order to retain employment).
106 LLOYD A. Fox, ASBESTOS ABATEMENT & REMOVAL: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
PLANNiNG 26 (1985).107 Id.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 523 and cmt. f (1965).
10 9 Id. § 496E cmt. c.
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assume the risk of injury which occurs in the normal performance of his or
her required job duties and responsibilities." 110
VII. CONCLUSION
The dangers of exposure to asbestos date back 2000 years, yet asbestos
abatement was not mandated until the late 1980s.1' Mandatory asbestos
abatement followed on the heels of court decisions that found asbestos
manufacturers subject to strict products liability.
Asbestos manufacturers asserted the defense of assumption of the risk
on the part of the worker in an effort to avoid liability. Courts following
the laissez-faire economic philosophy of the early twentieth century ruled
that the worker had assumed the risk of injury from exposure to
asbestos.112 The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Cremeans v. Willmar
Henderson Mfg. Co., however, appears to have closed off the defense of
assumption of the risk when the court held that "[a]n employee does not
voluntarily or unreasonably assume the risk of injury which occurs in the
course of his or her employment when that risk must be encountered in the
normal performance of his or her job duties and responsibilities." 113
Similar to the situation that Cremeans faced, operating a front-loader that
he knew posed a substantial risk of harm, the asbestos remover possesses
awareness of the substantial dangers of exposure to asbestos. Nevertheless,
the asbestos remover, like Cremeans, feels economically compelled to
perform his or her job duties in spite of the substantial risk of harm.
In adopting such a holding, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared it
unjust for the worker to absorb the cost of his or her injury alone. Thus, is
it not fairer to shift the costs, as the court did in Cremeans, of asbestos
removal to society as a whole, rather than place the entire burden on those
persons who feel economically compelled to seek and maintain employment
as asbestos removers?
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